Books
Not a Good Day to Die
The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda, by Sean Naylor ISBN 0425207870 This book is a must read book, period. It is written and extensively referenced by an imbedded reporter (101st Airborne) during Operation Anaconda, the last major battle of the Afghan war in early 2002. The author has also written for
Army Times. Don't expect a Clancy-like page turner; its not that kind of book. The level of detail at times is overwhelming as the cast of characters was large and from diverse operational units. The best word to sum up this book is
disturbing. You should take your own impressions from this book, but I will say it goes a long way to explaining the situation in Iraq.
Feynman Lectures on Computation
Richard Phillips Feynman (editors Anthony J. G. Hey, Robin W. Allen) ISBN 0201489910 Taken from lecture notes of a class titled
Potentialities and Limitations of Computing Machines given in the early 1980's at Cal Tech, this book again shows the genius of Feynman both in the breadth of his knowledge and his ability to convey it succinctly to others. A large portion of the material covers Turning machines and the limits of what can be computed (
computability) while other chapters tackle issues related to coding theory, thermodynamics and quantum computers. While concentration is required, this is not a text filled with formulas and esoteric math. The bottom line is: if Feynman wrote it then it is worth reading, even if some of the points may be dated.
Jawbreaker
he Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander by Gary Berntsen (w/Ralph Pezzullo) ISBN 0307237400 A short, heavily redacted book by the primary field agent during the key period of the war in Afghanistan. While Bernsten can be a bit hokey in his descriptions of people, he does a good job of conveying how the operation went down and the key, if not primary, role the CIA and other clandestine operatives played. While it was disappointing to see so much material redacted (some of which the author says is available in other published accounts), what is most disappointing is the failures of higher leadership both in the intelligence community and the defense department to close the deal when repeatedly given the chance. The desire not to take casualties or offend the native population clearly held sway even in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.