02 07 08 Senator Kyl On Our Nuclear Deterrent
Have you ever wondered if a politician read a statement their office put out? Or considered having someone else check it for believability first? We had that moment yesterday morning while reading the letters section of the Financial Times. There, across three columns, was a letter from Arizona Senator Kyl titled 'Next US president should modernise nuclear arsenal'. We will forgive him for the choice of headline as that is the job of the FT editor. The content, however, was all his and all very, very unconvincing. We did pen a response (not yet published) and portions of this post are from that letter. Brevity prevented us from doing in a letter what we can do here - address each of Kyl's points as he attempts to convince us the US nuclear deterrent is in dangerous decline.His first point is that
First, more than 31 countries have security guarantees with the US, many of which place those countries under the so-called US nuclear umbrella. ... We must be aware of the cascade of proliferation that will likely result if the world loses confidence in the US deterrent. Countries such as Japan, S. Korea, Germany and Turkey rely on the US deterrent so that they don't have to develop their own. Saudi Arabia has expressed interest in obtaining civilian nuclear power: the only logical explanation for this move is that the Saudis are concerned that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons. [emphasis ours]
Ah, where to start! Is there any evidence the world has lost confidence in the physical capacity of our nuclear deterrent? We have never heard anyone question the ability of the US to deliver a working nuclear weapon anywhere in the world at a moments notice. Perhaps instead Senator Kyl refers to the impression some may have (i.e. Japan) that the US no longer is willing to use our nuclear weapons except if similar weapons are used directly against the US and not a third party, ally or not. But that is decline in political will. Do you know where he is going with the Saudi statement? Is Kyl implying that the Saudis will somehow turn an advanced commercial light water reactor into a bomb making machine? This would be next to impossible when considering the design and fuel of these reactors, IAEA safeguards, no existing large scale working enrichment cascades nor a heavy water reactor to convert natural uranium into plutonium (as is speculated Iran's intention is for their IR-40 facility at Arak). Or maybe the Saudi royal family will hide behind the containment tower in the event of an attack by Iran? As to why the Saudis might want to use nuclear power? Over the long term they can sell domestic oil or natural gas on the open market for more than the cost of running a nuclear facility? The nuclear facility is cleaner than burning oil? Natural gas pipelines are far easier to sabotage? They need large amounts of power for desalinization plants?
His second point:
Second, rogue nations such as N. Korea, Iran and Syria continue to seek weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons capability. The US cannot assume a posture of disarmament while regimes such as these seek the world's most dangerous weapons.
Let us lay aside whether Iran and Syria are seeking to build nuclear weapons. Kyl's point here appears to be if the US reduces the inventory of nuclear weapons (deployed or in reserve) at all that will simply encourage these rogue nations to build their own bombs. We really do not see the connection. The US currently has about 3,800 deliverable deployed nuclear weapons with many more in reserve. N. Korea is the only one of the three countries mentioned to have attempted to detonate a working nuclear device - after over two decades of work on plutonium production and bomb design. At best, the intelligence community estimates N. Korea has 5-10 weapons (at most) and nobody can say for sure if they are physically small enough to be delivered on any of their ballistic missiles, none of which are able to reach the US at this time. Quite simply, the US could launch an attack against Russia, China, N. Korea, Iran and Syria simultaneously and still have weapons left over. Kyl's assertion that a reduction in our forces - we assume he envisions those proposed by Bush and Putin in the SORT agreement leading to 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed warheads on December 31, 2012 - would make any country more likely to seek nuclear weapons is beyond absurd. One can make a weak case for China trying to leapfrog to near parity with the US and Russia (ignoring the ready reserve of thousands more warheads) but to propose that Iran or others more likely to build because we can only destroy them 1,500 times instead of 3,000 times is crazy.
His third point is also weak:
Third, every nuclear weapons power -with the exception of the US- is currently modernizing its nuclear weapons and weapons delivery systems. Robert Gates, the US defense secretary, recently observed that Russia has chosen to modernize its nuclear weapons in place of conventional weapons. Yet the US continues to permit its nuclear forces to atrophy and decline.
Again, Kyl gives no evidence of failing warheads or failing missile delivery systems - land, air or sea based. That our total number of warheads in inventory is slowly declining is by choice as a result of past arms control agreements. The flip side, of course, is that Russia also reduced its nuclear forces. Kyl also omits a very important point in regards Sec. Def. Gates:
"It seems clear that the Russians are focused as they look to the future more on strengthening their nuclear capabilities," he told reporters after his visit to Langley. "So to the extent that they rely more and more on their nuclear capabilities as opposed to what historically has been a huge Russian conventional military capability, it seems to me that it underscores the importance of our sustaining a valid nuclear deterrent, a modern nuclear deterrent." "Russia is really not investing very much in their conventional forces. It's really clear and for a whole bunch of reasons, demographics and everything else," Gates said. Source: Reuters
Russia is 'modernizing' its nuclear forces for two primary reasons: 1) they cannot afford to compete with the US in terms of conventional forces and 2) they allowed their nuclear complex to decline in the same fashion as their other military forces. Given the monetary and strategic realities, getting the Russian nuclear deterrent back up to a credible and reliable level was their only alternative. If anything, the notion that some analysts thought the Russian force so weak and unreliable that a successful US first strike was within reach (and not deemed crazy to publish) probably spurred them on. As to Gates' statement about sustaining a 'valid and modern nuclear deterrent', one must remember the context of his speech - it was deliverd to the Air Force at Langley AFB after Gates fired the top two Air Force officials over concerns of negligence in the handling and securing of both nuclear weapons and component inventories.
So what is Kyl really on about? Kyl's statements are code words to justify production of the reliable replacement warhead (RRW), a program he has strongly advocated for many years. The RRW has been rejected consistently by Congress on technical grounds, most recently last fall after a "JASON" report raised serious questions on the certification plan saying "substantial work" remains. In this age of a de facto comprehensive test ban, any new nuclear weapon must pass stringent virtual testing (at least in part). Frankly, this makes us very uncomfortable as without an actual test one can never be fully certain that all aspects of a weapon model have been considered correctly and the new weapon works as planned. Just look to some of NASA's adventures sending space craft to Mars - only to have them fail at the last moment because someone used metric units instead of imperial - to see how easily things can go wrong at just the worst moment. But if we are to be forced down this road - giving up weapons which we know with certainty will work - then the people reviewing the program should be speaking enthusiastically about its prospects. Not the case with JASON.
Last year a nod was given to the current stockpile when a study done for the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) showed that plutonium 'pits' are expected to age well with a minimum life of 85 years. This eliminates one of the prime reasons to consider going the RRW route - that as the plutonium pits aged, they would suffer unpredictable changes and possible fizzles were the weapon to be detonated. In addition, to help push the RRW program NNSA has highlighted safety concerns with current weapon maintenance programs, such as with a new production facility for a specialized aerogel called Fogbank used in existing and refurbished weapons but not the RRW. Yet this rings hollow as this material was produced for decades on another production line and to our knowledge with no serious injuries - certainly none bad enough to cause a safety halt.
While the RRW has the potential to be more secure than some existing weapons by incorporating more recent PAL technology, current weapons are considered safe from accidental detonation or unauthorized use if somehow stolen, presumably by jihadists. Our present stockpile will continue as the most lethal and reliable in the world for many years to come with no pressing need for significant modernization nor an increase in the force. As missile technology improves, the existing delivery systems will be upgraded or phased out in favor of safer/more accurate/more reliable alternatives. In fact, the Air Force could go retro and revert back to the MGM-134A Midgetman SICBM ('small' ICBM) which was successfully tested in 1991 but later cancelled by President Bush as cold war tensions wound down (though it would only have the range of a Minuteman II, not III). However, current thinking at Space Command is that another round of modernization of the existing Minuteman III inventory is the best option. As noted in June, 2007 by Air Force Magazine Online:
The Air Force had planned to keep its current force of Minuteman III ICBMs in service until about 2020, after which time they were to be replaced by a mostly new design, which some dubbed “Minuteman IV.”
However, a recent Air Force Space Command analysis of alternatives suggests it would be wiser to keep the older systems around into the 2040s through a series of incremental upgrades. This plan has been approved by the Air Force requirements council, but is not yet final. Money was a huge factor. Over the years, Space Command officials noted, Minuteman III upgrades have succeeded in attracting political support and funding. Obtaining support for a costly new-start program would have been difficult, Gydesen said, and Space Command believes modernized Minuteman IIIs will meet all mission requirements.
In addition to the propulsion, guidance, and warhead programs currently in progress, several other improvements will be needed to keep the Minuteman III viable beyond 2020, when capabilities will begin to “efface,” in the words of missile officials. The long-term incremental upgrades will begin around 2020 with introduction of new guidance components, said Gydesen. The ongoing Minuteman III Guidance Replacement Program is improving maintainability and reliability, but does not offer accuracy improvements. Therefore, “Increment I” of the modernization process would provide that accuracy boost and is expected to dramatically improve the guidance system’s mean time between failure. Guidance enhancements would be followed by security and command-control-communications-computer (C4) improvements.
Finally, USAF would undertake booster and re-entry vehicle upgrades, “ultimately leading to [full operational capability] of the completed follow-on capability in the late 2020s,” Gydesen said. This, he said, would ensure an effective land-based nuclear deterrent “well into the 2040s and likely beyond.”
So, Senator Kyl, it seems our biggest concern is not with our existing nuclear deterrent but rather with our political system. Waving a handful of new nuclear tipped missiles at N. Korea, Iran, Syria or anyone else is not likely to have any positive effect on reducing tensions nor proliferation of WMD technology. Our current force is more than up to providing for the strategic safety of the US and backing up our diplomatic efforts if need be. But first there needs to be diplomacy, no?
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